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Abstract. We put forward a modern version of the ‘developmental’ view
of government-owned banks which shows that the combination of informa-
tion asymmetries and weak institutions creates scope for such banks to play
a growth-promoting role. We present new cross-country evidence consistent
with our theoretical predictions. Speciﬁcally, we show that during 1995–2007
government ownership of banks has been robustly associated with higher long
run growth rates. Moreover, we show that previous results suggesting that
government ownership of banks is associated with lower long run growth rates
are not robust to conditioning on more ‘fundamental’ determinants of economic
growth.
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In their attempt to prevent ﬁnancial meltdown in the autumn of 2008, governments in many
industrialised countries took large stakes in major commercial banks. While many countries in
continental Europe, including Germany and France, have had a fair amount of experience with
government owned banks, the UK and the US have found themselves in unfamiliar territory. It
is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that there is deeply ingrained hostility in these countries
towards the notion that governments can run banks eﬀectively.1 We show in this paper that such
views are not well founded. Our empirical ﬁndings which utilise cross-country data for 1995–2007
suggest that, if anything, government ownership of banks has, on average, been associated with
higher growth rates.
Hostility towards government owned banks reﬂects the hypothesis—known as the ‘political
view of government banks’—that these banks are established by politicians who use them to
shore up their power by instructing them to lend to political supporters and government-owned
enterprises. In return, politicians receive votes and other favours. This hypothesis also postu-
lates that politically motivated banks make bad lending decisions, resulting in non-performing
loans, ﬁnancial fragility and slower growth. The political view of government banks was pur-
portedly backed by empirical evidence in a paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(2002)—henceforth LLS—which utilises cross-country regressions that uncover a negative asso-
ciation between government ownership of banks and average growth rates. LLS predict a 0.23
percentage point increase in the annual long run growth rate for every reduction in government
ownership of banks by 10 percentage points, which is a very sizeable eﬀect. These econometric
ﬁndings have been used by the Bretton Woods institutions to back calls for privatising banks in
developing countries (see, for example, World Bank (2001)).2
1See for example the article by Martin Wolf in the 16th October 2008 edition of The Financial Times which aptly
summarises these views in its conclusion: “...Crisis-prone private banking is bad; government monopoly banking is
still worse.”
2World Bank (2001, p. 127) elaborates on the LLS results as follows: “...the ﬁtted regression line suggests that
had the share of government ownership in Bangladesh been at the sample mean (57 percent) throughout the period
from 1970 instead of at 100 percent, annual average growth would have risen by about 1.4 percent, cumulating to
a standard of living more than 50 percent higher than it is today.”
1Not all previous literature is unsympathetic to government ownership of banks. The ‘develop-
mental’ view of government owned banks, which dates back to Gerschenkron (1962), emphasises
the importance of governments in kick-starting ﬁnancial and economic development. To this end,
government ownership of banks can help address co-ordination problems that could prevent so-
cially beneﬁcial investments from being funded. More broadly, Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2008) show that government allocations can be more attractive than market allocations when
there are eﬀective controls on politicians or when self-enforcing risk-sharing arrangements in mar-
kets are not possible. In a similar vein, Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2008) show that
government owned banks may be more eﬀective in mobilising saving than private banks when
deposit contract enforcement in the private sector is weak. Moreover, a growing number of em-
pirical studies suggest that public banks in various countries have played a positive role in the
process of economic growth.3
Although the ‘developmental’ view may, at ﬁrst sight, appear to apply to the early stages of
economic development, we argue below that recent events make it relevant much more widely
today. The failures in corporate governance and regulation, which became apparent after the
global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–08, were present well before the crisis. Moreover, they are not too
dissimilar to the institutional weaknesses found in the early stages of development, which provide
scope for government banks to play a meaningful role.4 Many analyses of the crisis (e.g. Igan,
Mishra and Tressel (2009), Johnson (2009), Kane (2009) or Kane (2010)) suggest that banks
in developed countries behaved opportunistically by adopting excessively risky strategies aiming
more at maximising short term trading surpluses, implicitly or explicitly relying on government
safety nets to cover downside risks. As a ﬁrst step in our analysis, we explain how such strategies
can undermine the growth promoting role of privately owned banks, building on the theoretical
model of Andrianova et al. (2008).
3Speciﬁcally, bank-level studies suggest that in Germany and Russia public banks are more eﬃcient than private
banks (Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux 2001, Karas, Schoors and Weill 2008). There is also evidence from China,
where government owned banks dominate the banking system, which suggests that banks there helped to promote
economic growth, by boosting the productivity and value added growth of ﬁrms they ﬁnanced (Demetriades, Du,
Girma and Xu 2008, Rousseau and Xiao 2007).
4See, for example, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) for a classic analysis of the institutional weaknesses in Latin America
that led to the failures of bank privatizations in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Zhang and Underhill (2003) provide a similar
analysis of East Asian liberalisations that led to crises in the late 1990s.
2The second step in our analysis, which is empirical in nature, is two-pronged. Firstly, we
show that the LLS results, which pertain to an earlier period, are fragile to extending the set
of conditioning variables to include more ‘fundamental’ determinants of economic growth such
as institutional quality / quality of governance (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005), which
previous empirical literature has found to be signiﬁcant (Knack and Keefer 1995, Hall and Jones
1999, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004, Demetri-
ades and Law 2006). These new ﬁndings suggest that the support which the ‘political’ view of
government banks has previously received from cross-country regressions is fragile.5 We then
proceed to the second—and main—empirical contribution of this paper, which is to show that
government ownership of banks has been associated with higher average growth rates during
1995–2007. Because this is such a surprising ﬁnding, we provide numerous robustness checks,
including an extensive search for omitted variable bias using Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA)
and possible endogeneity bias using two alternative sets of instruments. We show that our main
ﬁnding is robust, suggesting that the ‘developmental’ view of government owned banks remains
relevant today.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 puts forward our theoretical contribution, which
can be considered as a modern version of the developmental view of government banks. Section 3
summarises the two data sets we utilise and their sources. Section 4 contains our empirical contri-
bution, which provides robust evidence of a positive association between government ownership
of banks and economic growth. Section 5 summarises and oﬀers some ideas for further research.
2 A modern version of the ‘developmental’ view of government
banks
The traditional ‘developmental’ view of government-owned banks emphasises co-ordination fail-
ures and ‘big-push’ phenomena, which can create scope for government owned banks to play a
growth-enhancing role. This view, however, predates the economics of information literature,
5We hasten to add that this does not necessarily invalidate case studies which provide support to this view
(World Bank 2001), although one must also acknowledge case studies which provide support to the developmental
view.
3which can provide an additional rationale for government-owned banks, particularly when the
institutions that are aimed at containing moral hazard in private banking are weak.
In whatfollows,we put forwarda new versionof the ‘developmental’view of government-owned
banks, drawing on the implications of imperfect information for bank behaviour and (the reality
of) varying eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial regulation. Speciﬁcally, we extend the model of government-
owned banks in Andrianova et al (2008) in a direction that allows us to explore the eﬀects of
opportunistic behaviour by banks on growth-promoting investment.
The informational problem that we focus on is the inability of depositors to observe the risks
taken by banks.6 When deposit contract enforcement is weak, banks can take excessive risks with
depositors’ money; at the extreme they could engage in looting behaviour. This is precisely the
set-up in Andrianova et al. (2008), which analyses the problems faced by depositors when deposit
contract enforcement is weak and some banks behave opportunistically. Andrianova et al. (2008)
assume that opportunistic banks will appropriate depositors’ money if they obtain a higher ex-
pected payoﬀ from doing so. Because that paper focuses on the implications of such behaviour for
savings mobilisation, the investment side of the model is a very simple one. Speciﬁcally, there is no
diﬀerence between an honest bank and an opportunistic bank when it comes to their investments.
Thus, Andrianova et al. (2008) is silent on the implications of banks’ behaving opportunistically
for economic growth (other than any indirect eﬀects through ﬁnancial development).
Here we model opportunistic behaviour by banks in a more natural way, by ruling out outright
appropriation of depositors’ money and instead allowing opportunistic banks to engage in specu-
lation. Speciﬁcally, the opportunistic bank chooses between a ‘sound’ investment available to all
banks and a speculative one that has a much higher payoﬀ in the good state but fails completely in
the bad state. In this setting, depositors can still lose all their money although we now introduce
deposit insurance that compensates them with probability less than one. There can, therefore,
be a divergence between the (expected) private and social returns of the speculative investment,
as a result of which this investment can, in general, be considered growth-reducing. These as-
sumptions accord well with many of the stylised facts surrounding the recent ﬁnancial crisis, such
6There are of course many other informational failures in banking that can provide a rationale for other forms
of government intervention including ﬁnancial regulation, deposit insurance, lender of last resort services and even
deposit rate ceilings. See, for example, Goodhart (1995), Goodhart (1988), Stiglitz (1993) or Hellmann, Murdock
and Stiglitz (2000).
4as the compounding of agency problems by complex ﬁnancial products, lack of transparency and
unreliable risk assessments by rating agencies. The assumption that some banks can engage in
speculative investments that can enrich bankers in the good state but would impose a burden on
the rest of society in the bad state is plausible. The anatomy of the recent crisis suggests that
some investments by banks were opaque and complex by design, in order to eﬀectively deceive
investors who lacked the information and skills to evaluate them. It is, therefore, not unreason-
able to postulate that such uncontained moral hazard will be growth-reducing. Besides the gross
expected social return being low or even negative once the costs in the bad state of the world are
taken into account, there is the additional cost that moral hazard induced ﬁnancial innovation
requires talented individuals to implement it; in itself this represents an additional important
distortion that is likely to reduce long run growth rates.7
We introduce a risky investment as a reason for deposit contract breach in the theoretical
setting of Andrianova et al. (2008) which in itself is an extended version of the “circular city”
model of product diﬀerentiation in banking.8 As in Andrianova et al. (2008), we have private
banks and a continuum of risk-neutral depositors located along a circle of unitary length. Depos-
itors are uniformly distributed with unitary distribution density. A depositor incurs a positive
transportation cost α which is proportional to the distance between the depositor and the bank.
In the centre of the circle, a single government-owned and operated bank is assumed to have been
in existence for some time, and as a result has equal appeal to all depositors.9
The depositors are endowed with 1 unit of cash but do not have direct access to this technology:
they could choose to put their cash holdings in a bank in order to earn a return. The money
collected from private depositors can be invested into a safe technology with a constant rate
7See, for example, Hakenes and Schnabel (2006) for a similar argument. Recent evidence utilising data from
44 countries during 1973–2005 in fact shows that wages in the ﬁnancial sector relative to the technology sector
had a negative and strongly signiﬁcant impact on technological innovation measured by the stock of patents (Ang
2010), providing empirical support for our conjecture. See also Acemoglu (1995) for a theoretical exposition of the
possibility that society may get trapped in a rent-seeking steady state equilibrium in which talent is misallocated.
8The “circular city” was originally developed by Salop (1979) and later applied to banking (Freixas and Rochet
1997) as an analytically convenient way to model deposit contracts competition among banks which diﬀer only in
their ﬁxed setup cost.
9This implies, in particular, a zero ﬁxed cost of the goverment bank.
5of return r. All banks, private and government-owned, have access to this “sound banking”
technology. A proportion γ ∈ (0, 1) of private banks have, in addition, access to a risky technology
which returns R with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) or zero with probability 1 − ρ. We call these private
banks “opportunistic” to distinguish them from the banks that do not have access to the gambling
technology (the latter are called “honest”): an opportunistic bank choses whether to invest safely
or to gamble with depositors’ money. The type of private bank is its private information, while
the value of γ is common knowledge. Because of the riskiness of the gambling technology, an
opportunistic bank fails to honour its deposit contract whenever the return on the investment
is zero. We think of this investment as speculative and socially unproductive. As such, it is
outlawed by the regulator: a private bank that chose to gamble is found out with probability λ
and if additionally the positive return from gambling is realised, the bank is ﬁned by the amount
f>0 per depositor contract. Investments in the risky technology that return zero are sunk and
in such case, depositors lose their deposit but with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) are compensated by the
amount 0 <d≤ 1 through a deposit insurance scheme.10
The governmentbank oﬀers a net deposit rate of rs = r0
s−α/(2π) > 0 to all depositors. Private
banks are located anywhere along the circle with bank i oﬀering deposit rate ri (i =1 ,...,n)
which is set up so as to maximise proﬁts. There are potentially many identical private banks that
can enter the industry at a positive ﬁxed cost, F, and with free entry n banks will enter.
The timing of events is as follows.
(1) Private banks decide whether to enter; n banks enter.
(2) Private bank i (i =1 ,...,n) sets its deposit rate ri.
(3) Each depositor chooses the bank in which to place the deposit of 1 monetary unit.
(4) Opportunistic banks choose whether to invest in a safe or risky technology.
(5) Risky investments are discovered with probability λ.
(6) Returns on investments are realized. Payoﬀs are realized.
10The depositor compensation probability does not have to be the same as the bank punishment probability.
Nevertheless, as the two measure diﬀerent aspects of government eﬀectiveness, they are likely to be highly correlated
and in the model we treat both as λ for expositional convenience.
6The model is solved by backward induction. Firstly, for a given strategy of opportunistic
banks (namely, safe or risky investment), depositors choose which bank (private or government
owned) to deposit their money. Secondly, given the realised deposit demand, each bank sets the
deposit rate at the level which maximizes its proﬁts. Finally, for a given level of demand and
proﬁt maximizing deposit rate, each private bank decides whether to enter.
Let κ ∈{ 0,1} represent an opportunistic bank’s decision to invest into the safe technology
(κ = 0) or invest in the risky technology (κ = 1). The expected payoﬀs of the depositor located
at distance xi from a private bank i and depositing his money in bank i is
U
pb
i (κ)=[ 1− γκ(1− ρ)]· (1+ ri)+γκ(1− ρ)λd− αxi, (1)
where κ is set by the bank to maximize its proﬁts. If the depositor, instead, puts his money into
the government bank, then his payoﬀ is
Usb =1+rs (2)
because every depositor is one radius away from the state bank and rs = r0
s − α/(2π). The
expected payoﬀs of an honest bank and an opportunistic bank are, respectively:
V 1−γ =( r − ri) · Di, (3)
V γ(κ,λ,d)=( 1 − κ)(r − ri) ·Di + κρ· [R − ri − λf] · Di. (4)
The government bank’s expected payoﬀ is V s =( r − r0
s) · Ds. There is an assumed bias against
the government owned bank:
Assumption 1 rs ≤ r − 3/2·
√
αF (A1)
(A1) states that in the absence of speculative investments, private banking is more eﬃcient than
government banking.
Assumption 2 αF > 1 and f ≥ R − r (A2)
(A2) states that the costs borne by private banks and depositors (set up and transportation) are
higher than an individual deposit, and also that the punishment on a bank found by the regulator
to have invested in the risky technology is higher than the excess return from the risky technology.
The assumption is a technical one and makes the model set up interesting.
7Three types of (pure strategy) equilibria are possible in this model. “High” equilibrium (HE)
where there is no demand for the government bank and no speculative investment by the private
banks; “intermediate” equilibrium (IE) with both the government and private banks having pos-
itive demand for deposit contracts, and “low” equilibrium (LE) where there is positive demand
only for the government bank and no private bank enters. For expositional convenience, deﬁne
the following bounds:
λg ≡














(1 − ρ)(1− λd)γrs
1 − γ(1− ρ)
￿
(7)
Proposition 1 Assume (A1) and (A2). A unique (pure strategy) equilibrium exists and it is of
type:




F/α, and n =
p
α/F (i =1 ,...,n);
(ii) IE, if λx ≤ λ<λ g. Then ri = 1
2[r+
rs+γ(1−ρ)(1−λd)
2(1−γ(1−ρ)) ], Di =[ r−rs −γ(1−ρ)(1+r−λd)]/α
and n<˜ n (i =1 ,...,n);
(iii) LE, if λ<min{λx,λ g}. Then Di =0(i =1 ,...,n), and n =0 .
Remark 1 The depositors’ demand for private banking is greater when the institutional quality
is higher and the proportion of opportunistic banks is lower.
This is easily veriﬁed by noting that in IE the demand for a private bank i, Di, is an increasing
function of λ and a decreasing function of γ.
Remark 2 When private and government banking co-exist, the productivity of capital is increas-
ing with institutional quality, decreasing with the proportion of opportunistic banks and (conse-
quently) increasing with the share of deposits in the government bank.
This immediately follows from the observation that in IE, the only equilibrium in which there is
positive demand for both private and government deposit contracts, the productivity of capital
is inversely related to the total capital invested in the speculative activity. The latter happens to
be γ · n(γ,λ)· Di(γ,λ), and it is rising with λ and falling with γ.
83 Data and Sources
For the ﬁrst set of regressions aimed at examining the robustness of the LLS results we use the
original database from LLS. We ﬁrst reproduce results from Table V and Table VI in LLS; we then
add two additional conditioning variables from the LLS database, which capture “institutional
quality”: the index measuring bureaucratic quality and its insulation from political interven-
tion (bqualitt) and the index of property rights (prop hf9), which measures how well private
property rights are protected.
For the new results we utilise annual GDP growth, GDP per capita and inﬂation rates from
the World Economic Outlook database. Annual GDP per capita growth (in 2005 US$) is from
the ERS. Data on institutional quality are from the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005)
Quality of Governance dataset. We create the average value of each institutional quality variable
from all the available databases spanning 1998–2005.11 Both transition economies and many oil
exporting countries have seen above average growth during the period. We therefore include two
dummy variables in the regressions. The ﬁrst is a “transition dummy” for all former members
of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics.12 The second is a dummy for all net oil
exporters: we use the Fearon (2005) pirmary commodity export measure and construct a dummy
for all countries were on average oil exports exceed 20% of exports. This is to control for countries
which have grown fast after their transitional recessions or on the basis of oil exploitation over
the period, regardless of economic instability, institutional quality or regulatory structures.
The government ownership of banks variables are from the various World Bank datasets on
banking regulation and ﬁnancial structure (Caprio, Levine and Barth (2008)—henceforth, CLB).
We supplement the CLB dataset with Cambodia, China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Iran, Iraq and
Yemen. These countries did not respond to the World Bank questionnaire on government own-
ership, but we assume due to the political situation that 100% of banks in these countries take
political orders. These variables measure the “percentage of (the) banking system’s assets in
11The table of pair-wise correlations in the Data Appendix shows a correlation of average regulatory quality and
government ownership of banks of −0.325. As in our previous paper, better regulatory quality is associated with a
lower share of government owned banks.
12The table of pair-wise correlations in the Data Appendix shows that transition has been strongly associated
with a strong growth performance in the period 1995–2007.
9banks that are 50% or more owned by government”. The data are available for 1999, 2001 and
2005. We also include the LLS variable for government ownership of banks in 1995 (with govern-
ment ownership at 50% for compatibility) for robustness checks. Correlation between the CLB
2001 and 2005 variables is high (.866) and the correlation between the CLB 1999 and 2001 obser-
vations slightly lower (0.721). The correlation between the LLS 1995 variable and the CLB 2001
and 2005 variable is 0.654 and 0.572 respectively. Data availability is best in the 2001 dataset
with 134 observations, compared to 110 in 2005, 103 in 1999 and 92 in the LLS dataset. Figure
1 shows the distribution of the 2001 CLB government ownership variable. Even after a decade of
determined privatisation under the “Washington consensus” a number of countries have preserved
often signiﬁcant shares of government ownership of banks.
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The LLS regressions include a variable for the average years of secondary schooling in the
labour force. We collect data on educational attainment from the World Development Report,
which records the percentage of the labour force with at least secondary education. We use the
ﬁrst available entry for secondary and tertiary education between 1995 and 2007 to maximise data
availability. The series is highly correlated with the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset on the average
number of years of schooling. For both variables the number of observations for the ﬁnal regression
speciﬁcation is low (80 observations or below) and there are no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects for
10the education variable. The results reported below therefore mostly exclude this variable.
More details on the variables we utilise and their sources, as well as summary statistics and
the list of countries on which the reported results are based are provided in the Data Appendix.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Fragility of LLS results
Table 1 demonstrates the fragility of the LLS results when (their own) institutional controls are
introduced in the equations. The ﬁrst and second columns are the original LLS regressions (from
LLS Table V and Table VI respectively) that we replicated and are reporting for comparison
purposes. Columns 3 and 4 introduce bureaucratic quality and the index of property rights si-
multaneously in the equations, both of which enter with positive coeﬃcients and are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. The consequence of this is that the government ownership variable loses signiﬁ-
cance. In the third column—which contains few other controls—its sign remains negative but the
magnitude of its coeﬃcient declines by more than three quarters. Speciﬁcally, it decreases from
just under 2.0 percentage points to under half a percentage point. In the fourth column which
contains additional controls the LLS coeﬃcient changes sign i.e. it is now positive. It is also
noteworthy, that the introduction of the institutional variables increases the adjusted R-square of
the regressions from 0.34 to 0.54 in the ﬁrst instance and from 0.50 to 0.64 in the second instance.
Besides the results reported in Table 1, we have ran numerous other models that are not reported
here for brevity but which conﬁrm the fragility of the LLS results. These include running the
regression with one institutional quality indicator at a time and using alternative institutional
variables.13
To summarise, government ownership of banking in LLS had a negative and almost always
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the published model speciﬁcations. However, the LLS mod-
els excluded institutional quality indicators which are widely considered the more fundamental
determinants of long run growth. As argued in Andrianova et al. (2008), government ownership
of banks is a symptom of weak institutions. If institutional quality is omitted from growth regres-
13Some of these can be found in the discussion paper version of our paper (Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland
2009).
11sions, government ownership acts as a proxy for the missing fundamental variable. This explains
the LLS results. Once, however, institutional quality indicators are added alongside government
ownership of banking, government ownership of banks is no longer signiﬁcant and the main LLS
ﬁnding evaporates. “Governance” matters, while bank ownership does not. The widely publicised
negative eﬀect of government ownership of banks was clearly the result of omitted variable bias,
rather than the true eﬀect of government owned banks on the long-run average growth rate.
4.2 Government Ownership of Banks and Economic Growth: 1995–2007
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the baseline model with diﬀerent samples of countries.
The ﬁrst column provides the estimates using the entire data set of 128 countries. The coeﬃcient
on government ownership is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Its magnitude of 0.036
size is quite large, suggesting that countries with 50% government ownership grew by 1.8% per
annum higher than countries without government owned banks, all other things equal. Moreover,
the remaining coeﬃcients have the expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. The second
column excludes seven countries with 100% government ownership of banks (China, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Myanmar, Iran, Iraq, Yemen) to check whether the main result is driven by these
countries. While the coeﬃcient on government ownership declines to 0.029, it remains sizeable
and highly signiﬁcant, suggesting that a 50% government share in the banking system resulted in
nearly 1.5% higher growth p.a. The third column excludes countries with population less than 4
million, which results in a reduction in the number of countries to 92. Nonethelss, the coeﬃcient
of interest, if anything rises slightly compared to the ﬁrst column, suggesting that small countries
are not driving the results.
Column 4 restricts the sample to the LLS countries in order to examine whether the diﬀerence
between our results and the LLS ones is due to the addition of ‘new’ countries in the later period.
Once again the coeﬃcient of interest remainspositive and signiﬁcantat the 1%level. If anything, it
rises slightly compared to the baseline sample. Column 5 utilises the LLS measure of government
ownership of banks (which is not available for the larger group of countries). This time the
coeﬃcient of interest declines to about half its size but remains positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Even with this smaller coeﬃcient, the eﬀect of a 50% government share is economically large: it
is associated with a nearly 0.9% higher growth rate during the sample period.
12Table 3 reports regression results with additional control variables as a ﬁrst check for possible
omitted variable bias. These variables include an oil dummy, inﬂation, banking concentration,
FDI and bank privatisation, added one at a time. Of these additional control variables, only two
appear signiﬁcant: FDI and the oil dummy, although the latter is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.
Notwithstanding the signiﬁcance or not of these additional controls, the coeﬃcient on government
ownership remains positive and signiﬁcant throughout. Its estimated coeﬃcient is rather large
suggesting that 50% government ownership of banks is associated with 1.6–1.9 higher growth p.a.
4.3 Extreme Bounds Analysis
Additional robustness checks are reported in Table 4, which summarises the results of an Extreme
Bounds Analysis (EBA), designed to check whether the main result is robust to the inclusion of
all possible linear combinations of an additional group of conditioning variables.14 The baseline
regression includes the variable of interest and a group of ‘focus’ variables which in our case include
initial GDP per capita, regulatory quality and a transition dummy. Initial GDP per capita is an
uncontroversialvariable to include in the focus group as it is intended to capture convergence. The
inclusion of the transition dummy in the focus group is intended to avoid potential upward bias
of the coeﬃcient of the variable of interest. Most transition countries experienced fast growth
during the period under investigation while their banking systems remained at least partially
under government control; not including a transition dummy could bias the coeﬃcient of interest
upwards as government ownership of banks may then to some extent act as a proxy for transition.
Including regulatory quality in the focus group can be rationalised by alluding to the literature
that emphasises institutions as a fundamental determinant of economic growth, and is consistent
with the uniformly highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients found for institutional quality in Tables 1, 2 and
3. The group of ‘doubtful’ variables that we include in our EBA comprises (i) the average inﬂation
rate; (ii) trade openness, deﬁned as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP; (iii) liquid liabilities
as a ratio of GDP; (iv) Foreign Direct Investment as a ratio of GDP; (v) banking concentration;
(vi) small country dummy and (vii) oil exporter dummy. Thus, the results presented in Table 4
are the summary outcome of running 256 regressions in the EBA (our ﬁxed set and 7 additional
14Extreme bounds analysis has its origins in the pioneering work of Leamer (1983) and has been applied extensively
in the growth literature. See for example, Bougheas, Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000).
13variables). The extreme bounds reported in Table 4 are the upper and lower bounds of the
estimated coeﬃcient of the variable of interest, plus or minus two standard errors, respectively.
As can be seen, the range between the lower and upper bounds does not include zero, which
suggests that the main result is robust.
4.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Considerable caution needs to be exercised when deriving policy implications from ﬁndings ob-
tained from cross-country regressions. The implicit assumption that is frequently made when
interpreting such results is that the long run relationship between the variables of interest is ho-
mogeneous across countries. This need not be the case if, for example, countries have diﬀerential
access to technology. If the relationship is heterogeneous across countries, the average relationship
estimated from cross-country regressions cannot be used to carry out policy experiments such as
“What is the eﬀect on country X’s long run growth if country X’s share of government ownership
increased by Z%?” Even if the long run relationship is homogenous across countries, it does not
necessarily follow that the direction of causality is the same across countries.15 Hence, while
government ownership of banks appears to have been associated with higher long run growth in
a cross-country setting during 1995–2007, our results should not be taken to imply that increas-
ing the degree of government ownership in countries with little or no government ownership will
result in higher long run growth rates. Although reverse causality would be hard to rationalise
in this particular case—there is no obvious reason why high growth rates should result in greater
government ownership of banking—the relationship, if homogeneous across countries, could re-
ﬂect common unobserved driving factors. Likely unobservable factors that may result in greater
government ownership of banks and have an impact on GDP growth include various forms of ﬁ-
nancial market failures. If such failures abound and if, also, institutions designed to contain them
are weak, governments may choose to nationalise banks. Such failures would of course correlate
negatively with GDP growth, so arguably the coeﬃcients of government ownership of banks on
15For example, although cross country regressions show that ﬁnance and growth are positively correlated, it does
not follow that ﬁnance leads growth in all countries; indeed time-series evidence suggests that causality between
ﬁnance and growth varies across countries. See, for example, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Arestis and
Demetriades (1997).
14growth in OLS regressions may display downward bias.16
The above analysis suggests that an important ﬁnal check of robustness of our results would be
to isolate the eﬀect of the ‘exogenous’ component of government ownership of banks on economic
growth in so far as this is feasible. To this end, Table 5 reports results from Instrumental Variable
regressions designed to shed further light on this issue. We utilise two alternative instrument sets
for government ownership of banks. This is partly because our preferred instrument set results
in a much smaller group of countries due to data availability. The second set of instruments
enables us to estimate the model on the entire data set, although the trade oﬀ is a less than ideal
instrument set.
Our preferred instrument for government ownership of banks is the black market premium
which is, by deﬁnition, a good indicator of the extent of market failure and/or institutional
weakness. This variable correlates well with government ownership of banks and much less so with
economic growth, making it an ideal instrument for government ownership.17 As an additional
instrument we also use bank failures at the beginning of the estimation period, which provide
another form of evidence on ﬁnancial market failure which frequently necessitates takeovers of
banks by government. In the regressions in which regulatory quality is treated as endogenous, we
additionally utilise latitude and regional dummies as additional instruments. The ﬁrst instrument
is in line with a large literature searching instruments for institutional quality which emphasises
the disease environment encountered by settlers from colonising powers as one of the primary
determinants that shaped the nature of a countrys institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2005). In similar
vein, regional dummies can proxy diﬀerent cultural attitudes towards institutions that govern
economic interactions such as, for example, property rights or economic and ﬁnancial regulation.
The downside of using the aforementioned instruments is that the sample is reduced to 58
countries, because the black market premium is missing for many countries. For this reason,
in order to check robustness further, we also utilise legal origin dummies as an alternative set of
instruments for government ownership of banks. These variables, which are available for the entire
16See, for example, Rodrik (2005) who has argued that we can learn nothing from regressing economic growth on
policies largely because the latter may reﬂect an optimal government response to market failure that is negatively
correlated to growth.
17The correlation coeﬃcient between the black market premium and government ownership of banks is 0.48; the
same variable has a correlation coeﬃcient with GDP per capita growth of 0.17.
15data set, are plausible instruments for government ownership of banks since legal origin is widely
believed to be a good predictor of ﬁnancial structure.18 Countries of Anglo-Saxon legal origin
are less likely to have government owned banks than countries of French legal origin. Similarly,
countries with socialist legal origin are more likely to have retained some government owned banks
than others, for historical reasons. However, pair-wise correlations between legal origin dummies
and government ownership of banks show that these variables are less strongly correlated with
government ownership than the black market premium. Moreover, they are not uncorrelated
with GDP growth, which suggests that they may be weaker instruments than the black market
premium.
The results of ﬁtting the baseline model to the data using the ﬁrst set of instruments are
presented in the ﬁrst and second columns of Table 5. The third and fourth columns show the
results using the instrument set that contains the legal origin dummies. The table reports a test
of the over-identifying restrictions—a signiﬁcant test statistic indicates that the instruments may
not be valid. The table also reports a test of weak instruments, which is, however, available only
when the model contains one endogenous regressor. We also report some ﬁrst-stage goodness
of ﬁt statistics to shed light on instrument strength. In the cases of more than one endogenous
regressor (columns 2 and 4), we report Shea’s partial R-squared.
Starting with column 1 in Table 5, it can be noted the coeﬃcient of interest remains positive
and highly signiﬁcant. If anything, it is slightly higher than in the corresponding OLS estimate.
This is, of course, not very surprising because, as explained above, endogeneity is more likely to
bias the coeﬃcient on government ownership downwards. Regulatory quality remains signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, while initial income remains negative but is signiﬁcant at only the 10% level.
The estimated coeﬃcients of both these variables are very similar to those obtained with OLS.
Importantly, the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected, suggesting that the instruments
are not invalid. Moreover, the hypothesis of weak instruments is strongly rejected. The results in
column 2, in which regulatory quality is also treated as an endogenous variable, are very similar
to those reported in column 1. Both the endogenous variables remain positive and are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. Although their coeﬃcients change somewhat, the estimates are not too dissimilar
18There is, however, some recent literature by legal scholars that questions widely held views in economics about
the relationship between legal origins and ﬁnancial market structure (Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems 2009), which
is the main reason we are slightly sceptical of its ability to predict ﬁnancial structure.
16from those obtained with OLS. Moreover, the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected at
the 5% level and the diagnostics from both the ﬁrst stage regressions indicate that the instruments
are not weak.
In the thirdcolumn, in which governmentownership is instrumented withlegalorigindummies,
the coeﬃcient of interest remains positive and signiﬁcant; its magnitude is about 1.0 percentage
point higher than the corresponding OLS estimates. The remaining variables remain signiﬁcant
and have the expected signs. Moreover, the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected sug-
gesting that the instruments are valid, while the hypothesis of weak instruments can once again
be rejected. Finally, the results in column 4, in which regulatory quality is also treated as an
endogenous variable, reveal that both the endogenous regressors retain their positive coeﬃcients
and are now sigtniﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient of government ownership is somewhat
higher than the one obtained with OLS while the coeﬃcient on regulatory quality doubles com-
pared to the corresponding OLS estimate. The remaining coeﬃcients have the expected signs and
are statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected and
the diagnostic statistics do not indicate that the instruments are weak.
4.5 The Trade-oﬀ between Regulation and Government Ownership
If government ownership of banks is indeed an answer to weak regulation, its positive eﬀects
on growth may well diminish as the quality of regulation improves. We test this corollary of our
analysis by introducing an interaction term between regulatory quality and government ownership
of banks in the baseline regression.
The results, which are obtained using both OLS and IV estimation, are reported in Table 6
Panel A. We also report the corresponding estimates of the baseline model without the interaction
term for comparison purposes. The OLS estimates suggest that the interaction term is negative
and highly signiﬁcant. The level terms remain positive and signiﬁcant, although with slightly
changed coeﬃcients. Government ownership has a slightly smaller coeﬃcient of 0.0287 compared
to 0.0359 in the baseline model, while regulatory quality has a slightly higher coeﬃcient of 0.0153
compared to 0.0112 in the baseline. These results suggest that at the world average of regulatory
quality (which is standardised at 0), a 50% government ownership of banks is associated with 1.4
percentage points of higher growth per year.
17Panel B in Table 6 uses the OLS estimates to report the partial derivatives of growth with re-
spect to government ownership of banks at diﬀerent levels of regulatory quality. These derivatives
decrease in regulatory quality. At the 10th percentile of regulatory quality the derivative is 0.0448
and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. It declines to 0.0371 at the 25th percentile and then to 0.0309
at the median level, remaining signiﬁcant at the 1% level. At the 75th percentile, the derivative
declines to 0.0189 and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. At the 90th percentile of regulatory quality
it declines to 0.01 and is no longer signiﬁcant. These results, therefore, suggest that government
ownership of banks has its greatest impact in countries with weak regulation. They also indicate
that even in countries with above average regulation, government ownership of banks is associated
with higher growth. It ceases to have an impact on growth when regulation reaches one standard
deviation above the mean.
However, these conclusions must be treated with some caution because the IV estimates re-
ported in panel A indicate that the interaction term is not signiﬁcant. These estimates have,
however, been obtained treating not only government ownership as endogenous but also reg-
ulatory quality and the interaction term. To obtain these estimates we used the legal origin
instruments and regional dummies and latitude set to start with, adding interactions between
the legal origins and latitude to instrument the interaction term. The results are not sensitive
to adding additional interaction terms to the instrument set. They do nevertheless continue to
provide strong support to the hypothesis that government ownership of banks and regulatory
quality are drivers of economic growth during 1995–2007, since both these variables enter with
positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. We cannot therefore be conﬁdent that the positive
association between government-owned banks and growth weakens with better regulation.
4.6 Summary
To sum up, the evidence we have presented in this section suggests that government ownership
of banks during 1995–2007 has been robustly associated with higher economic growth. Extreme
Bounds Analysis shows that this ﬁnding does not appear to be the result of omitting other poten-
tially important determinants of growth, such as openness, inﬂation, overall ﬁnancial development
or FDI. Moreover, we have shown that it is not the result of omitting bank privatisation from
18the regressions.19 IV estimations show that the main result does not reﬂect reverse causality or
common driving factors, although the latter, if important, would likely have biased the relevant
OLS coeﬃcient downwards. Finally, we have explored the possibility that the eﬀect of government
ownership on growth declines with the degree of regulation. We have found strong support to this
hypothesis from OLS regressions, which suggest that the eﬀect is very sizeable in weak regulatory
environments but becomes insigniﬁcant when regulation reaches the top 10% international stan-
dard. If true, this result suggests that government owned banks could be an eﬀective substitute
for good regulation.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that government ownership of banks has, if anything, been as-
sociated with faster long run growth. Speciﬁcally, we have found that, conditioning on other
determinants of growth, countries with government owned banks have, on average, grown faster
than countries with no or little government ownership of banks. It is therefore clear that, on
balance, government ownership of banks, where it prevailed, has not been harmful to economic
growth.20 This is, of course, a surprising result, especially in light of the widespread belief—
typically supported by anecdotal evidence—that “...bureaucrats are generally bad bankers” (see,
for example, World Bank (2001, p. 127)). Our results certainly suggest that such anecdotal ev-
idence cannot and should not be generalised. Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that
publically owned banks are no less eﬃcient than privately owned banks and have helped to pro-
mote economic growth (Altunbas et al. 2001, Karas et al. 2008, Demetriades et al. 2008, Rousseau
and Xiao 2007).21
19In the discussion paper version of the paper we show that privatisation has a positive eﬀect only when the
transition dummy is omitted when it acts as a rather crude proxy for transition.
20In the sense that, all other things equal, these countries did not have lower growth rates than countries without
government owned banks. It can, of course, be argued that countries with government owned banks and high growth
rates, like China, India and Taiwan, could have grown even faster if they had privatised their banking systems. This
is of course something that cannot be tested directly, although the evidence presented in this paper and elsewhere
(Demetriades et al. 2008, Rousseau and Xiao 2007) does not provide much support to this view.
21See also Ang (2010) who ﬁnds that ﬁnancial liberalisation measures that include bank privatisation have a
negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on technological innovation.
19There are a number of avenues for future research emanating from this paper. It could be
fruitful to re-examine the political view of government owned banks in light of our results. Our
conjecture is that the view can be turned on its head because corrupt politicians in democracies
might ﬁnd it easier to extract rents from poorly regulated private banks than from government
owned ones. New empiricalresearch could be fruitfulif longitudinaldata on governmentownership
of banks could be made available. Such data would allow exploiting the time dimension to arrive
at more precise estimates of the parameters of interest and could provide the basis for more
in-depth policy analysis.
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23Table 1: Robustness Checks of LLS
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of countries
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP, 1960–95
LLS Table V LLS Table VI LLS Models




Ia IIa Ib IIb
GB70 [gbbp 70] -0.0199*** -0.0152* -0.0045 0.0012
(0.0071) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0083)
Log of initial GDP per capita [logy60f] -0.0160*** 0.0157*** -0.0211*** -0.0204***
(0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0037)
Average years of schooling [ysch av] 0.0061*** 0.0044** 0.0028*** 0.0021
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0018)
High inﬂation dummy [infl d20] 0.0073 -0.0093
(0.0070) (0.0060)
Latitude [lat abst] 0.0039 -0.0004
(0.0184) (0.0157)
Private credit / GDP in 1960 [prif i60] 0.0217** 0.01467*
(0.0102) (0.0088)
Bureaucratic quality [bqualitt] omitted omitted 0.0040*** 0.0043***
(0.0010) (0.0011)
Property rights [prop hf9] omitted omitted 0.0081*** 0.0066**
(0.0029) (0.0031)
Intercept 0.0911*** 0.1019*** 0.0764*** 0.0808***
(0.0171) (0.0212) (0.0137) (0.0176)
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes
R2 0.3403 0.5012 0.5416 0.6390
Observations 85 82 83 80
Notes:
All variablesare deﬁnedin La Porta et al. (2002)and takenfrom La Porta et al databaseavailableat http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html.
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level; *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
24Table 2: Baseline Model with Diﬀerent Samples
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of countries
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP, 1995–2007
Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII
Sample Baseline Sample Excluding LLS countries LLS countries Excluding
100% government small
ownership countries
Government owned banks 0.0359*** 0.0289*** 0.0365*** 0.0370***
in 2001 (0.0072) (0.0089) (0.0093) (0.0080)
Government owned banks 0.0172***
in 1995 (LLS) (0.0065)
Log of initial per capita GDP -0.0046*** -0.0041*** -0.0036* -0.0044** -0.0020
(0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0015)
Regulatory quality 0.0112*** 0.0103*** 0.0089*** 0.0136*** 0.0071**
(0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Transition 0.0324*** 0.0332*** 0.0169*** 0.0234*** 0.0271***
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0059)
Intercept 0.0519*** 0.0488*** 0.0447*** 0.0479*** 0.0299***
(0.0128) (0.0146) (0.0174) (0.0159) (0.0119)
R2 0.4265 0.4031 0.2496 0.4714 0.4497
Observations 128 121 90 80 92
Notes:
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level; *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
25Table 3: Robustness Checks with Additional Control Variables
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of countries
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP, 1995–2007
Model VIII Model IX Model X Model XI Model XII
Government owned banks in 2001 0.0362*** 0.0382*** 0.0326*** 0.0326*** 0.0370***
(0.0079) (0.0072) (0.0101) (0.0074) (0.0098)
Log of initial per capita GDP -0.0059*** -0.0040*** -0.0066* -0.0045** -0.0044***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Regulatory quality 0.0147*** 0.0113*** 0.0167*** 0.0096*** 0.0137***
(0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0029)
Transition 0.0310*** 0.0282*** 0.0325*** 0.0321*** 0.0220***
(0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0046)
Oil exporter 0.0090*
oil > 20% of exports (0.0054)








Intercept 0.0592*** 0.0471*** 0.0640*** 0.0467*** 0.0471***
(0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0159) (0.0145) (0.0159)
R2 0.4983 0.4605 0.4363 0.4669 0.4750
Observations 103 124 95 116 80
Notes:
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level; *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
26Table 4: Extreme Bounds Analysis
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate of per capita GDP for 1995–2007
βgovernment−owned banks Observations R2 Additional Z variables Result
Upper Bound 0.0602 87 0.5836 Inﬂation, Concentration, Liquid Liabilites
Baseline 0.0359 128 0.4265 None Robust
(0.0072)
Lower Bound 0.0044 85 0.5831 Inﬂation, FDI, Liquid Liabilities,
Small country dummy
Notes:
Variablesincludedin everyspeciﬁcation: Government-ownedbanksin 2001, initialGDP per capita, regulatoryquality, tran-
sition. Doubtful(Z)variables: Liquidliabilities/GDP,openness,FDI, inﬂationrate, concentration,small country,oil exporter.
The upper bound estimate is the largest estimated coeﬃcient + 2 (robust) standard errors; the lower bound estimate is the
smallest estimated coeﬃcient −2 (robust) standard errors; the baseline is coeﬃcient estimate and robust standard error
in parentheses.
27Table 5: Government Ownership of Banks and Growth
IV regressions of the cross section of countries
Average annual per capita Model I Model II Model III Model IV
GDP growth rate 1995–2007
Instrumental Variables
Government owned banks in 2001 0.0404*** 0.0274** 0.0478** 0.0424***
(0.0067) (0.0124) (0.0219) (0.0133)
Regulatory Quality 0.0194** 0.0218***
(0.0086) (0.0087)
Exogenous Variables
Log of initial GDP per capita -0.0040* -0.0081 -0.0050*** -0.0094***
(0.0022) (0.0053) (0.0018) (0.0046)




Intercept 0.0445* 0.0786 0.0523*** 0.0875**
(0.0169) (0.0429) (0.0125) (0.0370)
χ2 test of over-identifying 0.14 4.95 4.02 5.89
restrictions [p-value] [0.70] [0.08] [0.13] [0.21]
F-test for weak instruments 36.09 12.37
[0.00] [0.00]
R2 (ﬁrst stage regressions)
Gov. ownership 0.3137 0.3722 0.2723 0.2377
Regulatory Quality 0.2504 0.1337
Observations 58 58 128 128
Instruments:
all exogenous variables plus Black market Black market Anglo-Saxon legal Anglo-Saxon legal
premium, bank premium, bank origin, French legal origin, French legal
failures 1995 failures 1995, origin, Socialist origin, Socialist
latitude, legal origin legal origin,
Sub-Saharan latitude, Sub-Saharan
Africa, East Asia Africa, East Asia
Notes:
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level; *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
28Table 6: Regulation-Government Ownership Trade-oﬀ
Panel A: Cross-country growth regressions
Method of Estimation
OLS Instrumental Variables
Baseline Model Model with Baseline Model Model with
Interaction Term Interaction Term
Government owned banks in 2001 0.0359*** 0.0287*** 0.0424*** 0.0385**
(0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0133) (0.0192)
Log of initial per capita GDP -0.0046*** -0.0059*** -0.0094** -0.0095**
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0046) (0.0039)
Regulatory quality 0.0112*** 0.0153*** 0.0218*** 0.0222***
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0087) (0.0073)
Transition 0.0324*** 0.0315*** 0.0326*** 0.0328***
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0065)




Test of over-identifying 5.89 7.58
restriction [p-value] [0.21] [0.18]
Observations 128 128 128 128
Panel B: Partial derivatives of growth with respect to government ownership of banks
(using OLS estimates)
Level of Regulatory Quality
10
th percentile 25
th percentile Median 75
th percentile 90
th percentile
0.0448*** 0.0371*** 0.0309*** 0.0189*** 0.0100
(0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0090) (0.0110)
Notes:
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level; *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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Description of Variables and Data Sources




per capita growth rate
1995–2007
2000–2007







World Economic Outlook database
Inﬂation average 1995–2005 177 World Economic Outlook database
Initial GDP per capita 1999 177 World Economic Outlook database
Initial GDP per capita 1995 173 In 2005 US$, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/
Government
owned banks
1995 92 Share of assets of the top ten banks controlled by the











“What fraction of the banking system’s assets is in
banks that are 50% or more government owned
as of yearend”. Caprio et al. (2008), perma-
nent URL: http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0.
1999 data from original database, 2001 data from
2003 database; 2005 data from 2007 database
Regulatory Quality (Rule





185 Measures whether regulation aids the functioning of private
markets (including banking supervision). It also measures
whether the regulatory burden is perceived to be excessive,





95 Percentage of labour force with completed secondary
education (% secondary education + % tertiary educa-
tion). World Development Indicators, December 2008
Openness Average
1995–2005
165 Export Share / GDP + Import Share / GDP.
World Development Indicators, December 2008
FDI Average
1995–2005
160 Net Foreign Direct Investment / GDP. World
Development Indicators, December 2008
Privatisation 1970, 1995 92 (Government ownership of banks in 1970) - (Govern-





1995 147 Beck, Demirgu¸ c-Kunt and Levine (2000)
Oil Exporters Dummy 1980–99 138 Countries in which average oil exports exceed
20% of exports. Calculated from Fearon (2005).
Transition Coun-
tries Dummy
1988 185 Countries of the Former Soviet Union and the Central and
Eastern European members of the former Warsaw Pact
30List of Countries
Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Es-
tonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Hong Kong
SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Myan-
mar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tai-
wan Province of China, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Van-
uatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
GDP per cap growth average 1995–2007 123 2.938 2.307 -2.857 15.150
GDP per cap growth average 2000–2007 123 3.330 2.931 -5.477 16.676
Government ownership of banks 2001 142 0.202 0.280 0.000 1.000
ln GDP 1995 124 8.196 1.525 3.918 10.907
ln GDP 2000 124 8.315 1.539 3.895 11.141
Inﬂation average 1995–2005 121 13.884 29.097 -0.070 197.474
Regulatory Quality 123 0.293 0.885 -1.987 1.889
Liquid Liabilities 108 0.536 0.421 0.063 2.887
Openness 121 88.257 44.890 21.128 296.321
Foreign Direct Investment 113 4.195 4.143 0.063 22.099
31Pairwise Correlation of Key Variables
[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
[1] GDP per cap growth
average 1995–2007
0.2341 -0.0522 0.2035 -0.0124 0.0758 0.4169 -0.0578 0.1194 0.4877
[2] Government own-
ership of banks 2001
-0.2894 0.2424 -0.4468 0.2383 0.0023 -0.1633 -0.1185 -0.0480
[3] Log GDP 1995 -0.1283 0.8116 0.1279 -0.0710 0.5721 0.2665 0.0503
[4] Inﬂation av-
erage 1995–2005
-0.2674 0.2257 0.1527 -0.2236 0.0119 0.0970
[5] Regulatory Quality -0.2232 -0.0617 0.5465 0.2643 0.0042
[6] Oil 0.0072 -0.0277 0.0018 0.0320
[7] Transition -0.1740 0.1379 0.0206
[8] Liquid Liabilities 0.4569 0.0899
[9] Openness 0.4191
[10] FDI
32